I.
Hanoch Dagan asks the question, "whether state values, whatever their institutional origin, have a legitimate role to play in private law." 1 Are state policies valid arguments in private law? His answer is a decisive Yes and No. Using the example of marital property, he asks: is population policy a legitimate argument in issues of marital property after divorce? No, because "promotion of a population policy cannot plausibly inform the entitlements of husband and wife against one another." 2 Should "divorce law . . . address the issue of gender discrimination"? Yes, because gender inequality is not a problem merely for women individually but also for the institution of marriage. The distinction is intuitively plausible. Of course, Dagan does not just express his personal political preferences but offers a well-reasoned argument.
He pleads for a "middle ground" position between what he calls autonomist and instrumentalist theories of private law. Against autonomy, he argues that private law necessarily holds a "thick perfectionist view of society." Against instrumentalism, he points to "normative constraints entailed by the bipolar structure of private law litigation." 3 His thesis in short: private law needs to be "responsive both to (minor) bipolarity constraints on the one hand, and to social values appropriate to the pertinent category of human interaction on the other." 4 At the same time, he does not put into doubt the highly controversial private/public dichotomy; instead, he reaffirms it emphatically. 5 Nothing in his argument, he insists, necessitates the collapse of the private-public distinction, although his account does require a rephrasing of its foundations. But then Dagan introduces an enigmatic criterion. Public values are legitimate in private law only when they do "not impose external goals on the parties' bipolar relationship, meaning goals that are alien or even potentially subversive to their relationship." 6 An "external social value" that "threatens to have an illegitimate impact from outside" would not be allowed to enter private law. 7 That raises a crucial question: What is the relation that establishes the boundary between what is internal and what is external? Is it really, as he suggests, the bipolar relationship between the parties, i.e., the litigation relation between plaintiff and defendant?
In my view, this enigmatic criterion upon which Dagan's whole argument relies is in fact undermining the public/private distinction, which he, however, wants to maintain. With the internal/external distinction, the identification of public values with state policies, which he suggests, can no longer be maintained. I suggest that Hanoch Dagan's enigmatic distinction between internal and external public values will become plausible only after rethinking the public/ private divide.
II.
It has almost become a ritual these days to de-construct the private/public distinction. 8 The problem is, however, that nobody knows how to displace it, not to speak of how to replace it. Political philosophers have again and again analyzed the breakdown of the boundary between state and society, but what they offer instead is a diffuse 11 The claim is this: contemporary social practices can no longer be analyzed by a single binary distinction, neither in the social sciences nor in law; the fragmentation of society into a multitude of social segments requires a multitude of perspectives of self-description. 12 Consequently, the distinction of state/society which translates into law as public law vs. private law-which Hanoch Dagan defends vigorously-will have to be substituted by a multiplicity of social perspectives which need to be simultaneously reflected in the law.
Private law will need to re-enforce its elective affinity to the contemporary plurality of discourses-not only its affinity to the economy as it is predominantly understood today, but also to the many contextures of intimacy, health, education, science, religion, art, and media. This would lead to a thoroughgoing reflection within private law about the distinctive proper rationalities and proper normativities of these various realms of discourses, as opposed to the mere invocation of individual private autonomy.
The point is simultaneously to de-politicize private law and to deeconomize it, to distance it not only from the "public sector," i.e., from institutionalized politics, but also from the "private sector," i.e., from When he rejects the use of population policy as a guideline for marital property law, he argues for a de-politicization of private law. When he rejects calculating the "accurate valuation of both spouses' contribution, taking into account non-market work and interpersonal support," 13 he argues for a de-economization of private law which is also implicit in his critique of legal economics as a radical version of legal instrumentalism. It has become commonplace today to stress the difference of an efficiency-driven private law from the regulatory policies of the welfare state and to stress the autonomy and decentralized rule production of the former from central legislative intentions of the latter. 14 It is much less well understood that private law cannot be identified simply with juridification of economic action. Indeed, this has been the great historical error of mainstream private law doctrine: "Private law has become the domain of property and economic relations." 15 Contract law has increasingly been reduced to the law of market transactions. The law of private associations has been boiled down to the law of business organizations. Property law has been understood as nothing but the basis for market transactions, and tort law as the set of policies and rules that internalize economic externalities and eradicate third party effects.
These are understandable errors, of course. Legal doctrine had to adapt to the double Great Transformation of the twentieth century, the victorious imperialism of both the economic and the political systems that have divided the social world into two great spheres of influence. On the one side, economic action developed totalizing tendencies in its society-wide expansion and transformed non-commercial social relations, e.g., the relationships of the classical professions to their clients, into profit-oriented economic relations. Private law followed this ongoing commercialization of the social world, sometimes reluctantly, always obediently. On the other side, there was the apparently unstoppable growth of the welfare state, transforming all types of social activities into public sector services. Accordingly, private law abdicated its responsibilities for the societal responsiveness of these activities in favor of governmental policies and public law principles. This error has been the common starting point for the great influential ideologies, liberalism and socialism, in their countless variations and combinations. Their disagreement was about one, and only one, alternative, whether private law should re-13. Dagan, supra note 1, at 820. If there is one lesson that private law could learn from contemporary social theory then it is the lesson that social autonomy, i.e., the capacity for self-regulation of a social segment, is not confined to the market mechanism of the economy but is realized via different forms in many other social worlds of meaning. There is a group of theories which explore the bewildering diversity of conflicting rationalities. Theories of discourse plurality á la francaise celebrate le différend between conflicting genres of hermetically closed language games based on different grammars and life practices. 16 The more sober Anglo-American New Institutionalism distinguishes a plurality of governance regimes that produce specific routines, normative patterns, and institutional requirements, and analyzes the resulting politics of inter-institutional conflicts. 17 German neo-romantic autopoiesis imagines a rich plurality of self-producing contextures in which specific operations, codes, and programs emerge and shape the rich tapestry of the many social worlds, but wholly without a prestabilized harmony. 18 In light of these theories, private law would need to redirect the rather confused debate about its conceptual and normative unity and to focus attention on how to calibrate its conflict-resolving doctrines and procedures to the politics of collision between different discourses, institutions, and systems. 19 Yet another group of theories attempt to draw normative consequences from this discursive pluralization. Critical theory takes for granted a plurality of different life-world discourses with different logics of argumentation and develops normative arguments for their 16 compatibilization. 20 Post-modern social and legal theory discusses a plurality of structural places, of autonomous sites of power, knowledge and law production, making a case for local micropolitics. 21 Theories of directly deliberative polyarchy observe the emergence of hybrid public-private governance regimes which operate autonomously as problem solving units and which, if suitably institutionalized, will generate new forms of deliberative coordination and social learning. 22 Communitarian theories distinguish between different "spheres of justice" which institutionalize diverse moral ideas about equality. They postulate that political legal institutions need to abandon their universalist ambitions and draw upon this particularistic norm formation. 23 Since private law is intimately linked to spontaneous norm production, private law theory should make use especially of those theories that stress the aspect of spontaneous self-organization, autonomous setting of boundaries, and the emergence of genuine forms of normativity within social fields. There is, however, one crucial normative consequence to be drawn from the pluralism of private autonomies. The remarkable responsiveness which private law has in the past developed toward economic markets by elaborating complex commercial contracts, business organizations, economic property rights, and business standards, may serve today as the great historical model for its relation to other autonomous discourses in civil society. The precarious balance between self-regulation and intervention which private law has maintained in its relation to economic markets needs to be institutionalized in other sectors of civil society.
A non-reductionist concept of private law, thus, would identify many social spaces where spontaneous norm-creation is the source of law. Against the autonomists, Hanoch Dagan rightly stresses "the rich social fabric that serves as the inevitable context for the parties' relationship." 24 The astonishing pluralism of new forms of voluntarily chosen intimacy relations and the abundancy of new contracts about intimate partnerships provide an example of non-economic private law in civil society. Spontaneous rule making processes in civic movements and in non-profit private organizations provide another. In this perspective, Hanoch Dagan's distinction internal/external would take on a different meaning. "Internal" would no longer refer to the narrow bipolar litigation relation between plaintiff and defendant but instead to the broader "living legal relation" between the actors involved, to their social interaction and to the encompassing social system in which their concrete relation is embedded. "External" would refer to political and economic processes which tend to impose their orientations on the socially embedded relation. Indeed, it is private law's constitutional role to protect the integrity of the socially embedded relation against those intrusions if they are not compatible with them. 27 Of course, this does not isolate private law from the public policies of the state and from the efficiency requirements of economic action. But it creates a mechanism which filters out state policies and economic imperatives when they are not compatible with the inner normativity of the social institution involved.
In this sense, the public/private divide takes on a new meaning. It is radically separated from the state/society distinction as well as from the public law/private law distinction. Indeed, it stands orthogonal to them. The traditional private/public duality is dissolved into a plurality of social segments (polycontexturality). The so-called "public" politics and the so-called "private" economy are only two of a whole variety of social segments. However, the "public" then reappears within each social system-now in a different sense-as that system's expression of its intrinsic normativity, which private law legitimately takes into account. In contrast, the category of "private" would then be reserved to the pursuit of individual and collective actors' self-interest. This resonates, of course, with the work of legal philosophers like Lon Fuller or normative sociologists like Philip Selznick who stress the intrinsic normativity of social institutions. 28 In my formulation, however, "public" in this new sense would refer to an internal reflection process within the focal social institution which decides on the balance between its social function and its contributions to individual and collective actors. Of course, private law does not and cannot dictate this reflection process. Instead, it needs to be responsive to it and simultaneously participate in it through judgments in individual litigation, which are in their turn exposed to the continuing reflection process.
To summarize my argument, the public/private divide needs to undergo a dialectical Aufhebung in the double sense of destruction and preservation. (1) The simple duality needs to be destructed and replaced by the multiplicity of social perspectives which then are reconstructed within the law.
(2) In a very limited sense, the old public/private divide will be preserved insofar as this divide is understood as the difference between political and economic rationality, which, however, are only two among many other social rationalities.
(3) In a different sense, the public/private divide is preserved since it reappears in each contexture of polycontexturality as the precarious difference between societal responsibility and the pursuit of actors' interest, and private law needs to be responsive to this divide.
To allude to some examples: why is expert liability extended to third parties outside the expertise contract? The reason is not the protection of the third party's interest but the creation of a symmetric liability toward both members of the project which protects the integrity of expertise as a social institution. Banks are blocked from striking guarantee contracts with family members of the debtor because the integrity of intra-family communication is protected against the intrusion of economic rationality. Many of the enigmatic con-tort relations are not just impositions of judicial activism, they are rather the legal reformulation of spontaneous orders in different social fields. Good faith obligations do not refer to state policies, but rather to the idées directrices of multiple social institutions. Constitutional rights in the "private" sphere are not transfers of state constitutional rights from the vertical relation state-citizen to the horizontal relation between citizens; instead, they protect the integrity of individual and social autonomy against anonymous social processes within different sectors of society. All these examples have in common is that they make private law responsive to the public dimension of social configurations which have nothing to do with state policies. 29 In one sentence: Hanoch Dagan's ultimate aim which is "to fracture and multiply human authority" is better served by the many sites of polycontexturality than by the simple "differentiation between the private and the public."
